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How do NGOs spend their development assistance? This column discusses 
research showing that NGO aid is no better targeted to the neediest countries 
than state aid agencies either by choosing needier countries, or by entering un-
chartered waters and trying to excel where state aid is most likely to fail.
 
Exposing the flaws of official development aid (ODA) is fairly easy. State aid 
agencies provide critics with the data needed, for example, to figure out the 
extent to which ODA allocation is distorted by selfish donor motives such as 
export promotion or forming political alliances. It’s different with aid from non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). The allocation of NGO aid is of 
considerable importance in quantitative terms: The annual budget of World 
Vision International, for example, exceeds the official foreign aid budget of 
Italy. Plan International spends more than Greece on development projects 
each year and the Save the Children Alliance more than Finland. Overall grants 
by NGOs based in OECD countries amounted to almost $15 billion annually in 
2005 and 2006, thus exceeding bilateral ODA from every individual donor 
country except for the United States. Given the huge amount of aid involved, it 
is surprising that NGO aid has hardly been mapped, let alone explained. 
Arguably, the main reason is that sufficiently detailed data are hard to come 
by. Maybe it’s for good reasons that NGOs are reluctant to open their books: 
Critical analysis could tarnish the favourable image of superior donors that they 
enjoy.
Strong beliefs, weak evidence
It has long been an article of faith that NGOs provide well-targeted aid (e.g., 
Tendler 1982). NGOs are widely believed to be closer to the poor than state aid 
agencies are. They may directly deal with local target groups, circumventing 
(frequently corrupt) recipient governments. This may reduce leakage and result 
in better alignment with the needs of the poor. Furthermore, bilateral and 
multilateral ODA has been shown to be biased for political reasons (e.g., 
Kuziemko and Werker 2006, Dreher, Sturm, Vreeland 2008). The allocation of 
NGO aid should be less distorted by commercial and political self-interests of 
donor governments.
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Even donor governments appear to share the view that NGOs have an 
important role to play for aid to reach the poor and render it more effective. 
The share of bilateral ODA channelled to or through NGOs reached up to 20 
percent in recent years for some donor countries (see Dreher, Mölders, 
Nunnenkamp 2008). But already by the 1990s, some critics suspected that the 
case for NGO aid largely rests on ideological grounds. In particular, the view 
that NGOs have a clear focus on the poor has come under attack. Rather than 
trying to outperform state agencies and risk failure, NGOs may prefer the 
quieter life of implementing the policy agenda of their home government, 
especially if they depend financially on official “backdonors”. Both the critics’ 
attempts to demystify NGO aid and the proponents’ articles of faith have hardly 
been subjected to empirical scrutiny.
Some interesting insights may be gained, however, on the basis of data we 
collected for some 60 quantitatively important NGOs based in various OECD 
countries. Taken together, they granted aid on the order of $ 5.7 billion in 
2005, nearly as much as the sum of ODA by all four Scandinavian countries. 
The representativeness of the NGO sample may be questioned, and aid flows 
refer to just one year. Yet some of our findings for this sample put into serious 
doubt the view that NGO aid is generally superior to ODA with respect to 
targeting the needy and deserving countries.
This is despite the fact that NGOs tend to be more active in recipient countries 
with more pressing need for aid. But the poverty orientation of NGO aid does 
not appear to be particularly strong, for example when looking at the extent to 
which rising per-capita income of recipients reduces NGO aid. Employing a 
multivariate regression framework and controlling for various factors (a 
country’s level of democracy, the amount of bilateral ODA it receives, the 
number of other NGOs present in the same country, joint religion of the NGO’s 
home country and the recipient country, population size of the recipient 
country), we find that NGO aid significantly decreases with per-capita GDP, but 
not dramatically so (see the fitted values of the partial leverage plot in Figure 
1) (Koch et al. 2008).
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According to the World Bank, NGO aid has an important complementary role to 
play when governance is particularly bad and the local environment is highly 
distorted – a view echoed in various UN and national aid policy documents 
(e.g., World Bank 1998 and United Nations Millennium Project 2005). But NGOs 
hardly make use of their perceived comparative advantage of engaging in 
countries with “difficult environments,” i.e., under conditions in which 
government-to-government transfers are unlikely to work. As Figure 2 shows, 
NGO aid is not targeted towards less democratic countries (again controlling for 
other factors), possibly because NGOs refused to accept the role assigned to 
them by official donors and focus on countries “left over” by bilateral ODA.
Keeping a low profile
Rather than trying to excel by working in difficult environments, NGOs appear 
to have taken the easy road of replicating the allocation behaviour of their 
home government. The strong tendency to mimic official backdonors revealed 
in Figure 3 supports critics pointing to the limits to autonomous decision-
making of NGOs that depend on government funds.
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NGOs also tend to follow their peers, so NGO aid becomes clustered (see Figure 
4). Some so-called “donor darlings” receive over 20 times more NGO aid per 
capita than “donor orphans”. Hiding in the crowd may help ensure future 
funding since the conformity of location choices renders it difficult for 
backdonors to assess the performance of any particular NGO (Fruttero and 
Gauri 2005). NGOs may also prefer engaging in countries where other NGOs 
are already active because this allows them to piggyback on the efforts of their 
peers in training local staff and strengthening local organisations. Taken 
together, NGOs are contributing to the divide between donor darlings and aid 
orphans.
NGOs may draw some comfort from the finding that the distribution of NGO aid 
is hardly affected by commercial and political self-interests that state agencies 
are often found to have when granting aid. Yet there is one similarity between 
official donors and NGOs even in this respect. Both tend to favour former 
colonies and/or recipient countries with common traits related to religion and 
language (Koch et al. 2008). While this preference may be justified by 
comparative advantages of working under such conditions, picking recipient 
Page 4 of 6Scrutinising non-governmental aid | vox - Research-based policy analysis and comme...
04/02/2012http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1156
countries according to colonial ties or cultural similarities may well violate a 
needs-based allocation of aid.
All this invites the conclusion that NGO aid is no panacea to provide aid that is 
better targeted to the neediest countries. In contrast to what one might expect, 
NGOs seem to prefer keeping a low profile. They do not distinguish themselves 
from state aid agencies either by choosing needier countries, or by entering 
unchartered waters and trying to excel where ODA is most likely to fail.
Some open questions remain: What exactly lies behind NGOs’ tendency to 
replicate the location choices of both official donors and their peers? Do NGOs 
relying strongly on official backdonors behave differently from those being 
financially autonomous? There is an urgent need for better data and more 
research on the increasing number of quantitatively important private donors, 
as these first findings on NGO aid are rather discomforting in light of reaching 
the Millennium Development Goals.
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